QuickTopic Discussion Board Available

[Note - this is an archived version of the original posting from 02:50 AM EDT, Apr 25 2003]

I've set up a QuickTopic discussion page to give readers a place to discuss the topics raised on this weblog. At this point I don't expect much traffic, so it's probably not worthwhile to create a new discussion page for each entry.

Try it out, if you have something to say!

Here's the link.

Fair Use is Not a Right

[Note - this is an archived version of the original posting from 10:40 PM EDT, Apr 24 2003]

Here is a copy of a posting I made last year to the cypherpunks mailing list. It challenges claims made by some that DRM is evil because, among other things, it can take away "fair use" rights. This is an argument from a libertarian perspective that DRM is a perfectly fair type of contract even when it offers no exceptions for "fair use".

Suppose you know someone who has been working for years on a novel. But he lacks confidence in his work and he's never shown it to anyone. Finally you persuade him to let you look at a copy of his manuscript, but he makes you promise not to show any of it to anyone else.

Hopefully it is clear in this situation that no one is doing anything "evil". Even though he is giving you the document with conditions beyond those specified in the current regime of copyright, he is not taking advantage of you. Even though you hold the bits to his manuscript and he has put limitations on what you can do with them, he is not coercing you. You voluntarily accepted those conditions as part of the agreement under which you received the document.

It should also be clear that it would be ethically wrong for you to take the manuscript and show it to other people. Even if you take an excerpt, as allowed under "fair use" exemptions to copyright protection, and include it in a document for commentary or review purposes, that would be a violation of your promise. This example demonstrates that when two people reach a mutual agreement about how they will handle some information, they are ethically bound by it even beyond the regulations of copyright law.

And surely it is clear that no decisions by Congress or any other legislative or judicial body can change the ethics of this situation. In fact, it is absurd to look to Congress for guidelines on ethics! Surely everyone reading is aware that it is one of the least ethical bodies in existence. Those who look to Congress to justify breaking their promises are not looking for ethics, they are looking for excuses. Congress excels at providing those.

The point is that this situation is exactly analogous to what might happen if you purchased a song or other information content by downloading, and restrictions were placed on how you could handle it as a condition of that purchase. One of the restrictions might be that you can make no more than 2 copies of the song for personal use. Another restriction might be that if you give a copy to someone else, you have to delete your copy.

Such restrictions cannot be evil, any more than was the even more strict restriction imposed on the recipient in the book example above. Evil only exists when someone is forced to do something they don't want to. Offering a song or a book with conditions does not force anyone to do anything, because the offer can always be refused. There can be no evil in making someone an offer, even an unacceptably restricted one.

In fact, making or accepting any kind of offer, with any restrictions which the parties choose, is a fundamental freedom which everyone reading this should fight to support. To say that people can only make or accept offers which some third party deems acceptable is a coercive infringement on people's liberty to make their own decisions and to control their lives. It is despotism of the worst sort. Third parties have no right to interfere in the agreements which others make.

Smart Lynch Mobs?

[Note - this is an archived version of the original posting from 04:20 PM EDT, Apr 24 2003]

Last year I bought Howard Rheingold's book, Smart Mobs, about how new portable telecommunication technologies are allowing people to organize themselves in the physical world in novel ways. One of his examples was the use of SMS messaging to set up demonstrations and freedom rallies in the Far East.

Now we see a new and more sinister type of Smart Mob, which I am calling a Smart Lynch Mob. Wired Online reports about SMS messages feeding the SARS hysteria in Hong Kong. The most recent service will send SMS alerts to notify receivers of "contaminated" buildings where those suspected of being SARS carriers have recently visited!

It's just a matter of time before this technology would allow SARS victims themselves to be identified, located and publicly branded. Combining these SMS alerts with future visions of augmented reality, we could imagine that SMS patients would be labelled via a computer overlay as they walked down the street, carrying a virtual scarlet letter, in effect.

The point is that this technology can be used for harmful as well as helpful purposes. Rheingold titled his book Smart Mobs, but a mob has never been considered a beneficial form of human organization. Mobs are uncivilized, irrational and prone to violence. SMS in Hong Kong is proving to be better at rumor-mongering than in spreading useful information, according to the Wired Article.

If we do face a future of Smart Mobs, we should be prepared for the bad side as well as the good. I'm not in love with a technology which is going to bring us back to the age of the mob.

Thanks!

[Note - this is an archived version of the original posting from 03:10 PM EDT, Apr 24 2003]

I want to take this opportunity to thank "zem" for setting up this service. It is wonderful to finally have a forum for publishing my thoughts, uncensored, with a reasonable degree of privacy and anonymity.

For too long have anonymous writers been second-class citizens on the net. I engaged in an extensive online debate and discussion last year regarding the merits of the various proposals for Trusted Computing, like TCPA and Palladium. My messages were a model of respectful and restrained debate (with one possible exception, which I still feel was justified). Yet I was treated in an utterly disrespectful manner.

The cryptography list moderator refused to post many of my initial messages. Luckily I also crossposted to the cypherpunks list, so that people were able to see them and respond. Due to the nature of the email headers, their responses were directed to both lists, putting the cryptography moderator in the sticky position of deciding whether to approve a message that expressed a position he supported, but which quoted my material, which he had censored. It was only when it was clear that my messages were the foundation for the ongoing discussion that he began to carry them.

I also debated the issue on sci.crypt, only to discover later that none of my messages were appearing in the Google archives! That's right, Google refuses to archive messages from known anonymous posting addresses. Unbelievable. The historical record of that discussion is now fragmented and one-sided, with people responding to messages which are non-existent in the archives. And many of my strongest arguments, which received no rebuttals, will not be heard by those who use the archives to educate themselves on this issue.

Not only were these institutional arrangements disfavorable to an anonymous contributor, the community at large was generally hostile as well. I was constantly subjected to insulting and harrassing comments about my motivations and supposed lack of intelligence - for supporting people's rights to use technology! I was called a "stooge"; people demanded to know if I worked for Microsoft (I never have). I was an "idiot" (later softened to "intelligent idiot").

Never in all my days of non-anonymous posting have I been subject to such insults. Quite the contrary; in most forums I have established a very strong reputation for careful and honest analysis. Only now, while publishing anonymously, I found myself reduced to the status of a pariah. It was a humbling and educational experience.

All this is by way of expressing my deep thanks to "zem" for his work in setting up this anonymous blogging service. At last there will be a place where I don't feel like a second-class citizen, somewhere that my messages can be posted and archived and referenced. I can build up my arguments and philosophy patiently, over time, and in that way demonstrate the merits of my position.

He's done a great job of making the service easy to use, too (at least for those of us who are accustomed to anonymous communications). And the published blog entries look great, too - crisp and clean.

So again to "zem", thanks and kudos. This means a great deal to me and hopefully to many other anonymous writers who will benefit from your generosity, talent and hard work.

Linus is OK with DRM

[Note - this is an archived version of the original posting from 01:10 PM EDT, Apr 24 2003]

There's a great discussion on Slashdot this morning about Linus Torvalds approving Linux kernel support for DRM.

Linus writes: "I want to make it clear that DRM is perfectly ok with Linux! There, I've said it. I'm out of the closet. So bring it on..."

Linus seems to be motivated primarily by respect for decisions made by others. What a refreshing viewpoint in an online community which too often demands that people not be allowed to make the decision to use DRM, or TCPA, or Palladium! People should be free to use whatever technology they want, whether personal encryption or trusted computing. And that freedom applies equally to end users, to artists, and to publishers and distributors.

That's Unlimited Freedom. And that's why I'm writing.

Censorship on the Cryptography List

[Note - this is an archived version of the original posting from 04:40 AM EDT, Apr 24 2003]

The moderator of the cryptography@metzdowd.com mailing list engages in censorship of views that he doesn't like. He passes on posts which are nothing but empty philosophical ramblings as long as he agrees with them, but refuses to publish messages which challenge the conventional wisdom.

Take a look at the posting below as an example. It's a response to another message, published April 21 on the list, message ID 3EA4435D.10908@monmouth.com. It should be visible in the mailing list archive but that hasn't been updated in a week at this writing.

In my message, I respond to what I consider some rather facile criticisms of the music industry, and then offer several very good and pertinent links with tremendous information about Digital Rights Management (DRM) and the many issues associated with it. These links would be helpful and informative to the ongoing DRM discussion on that mailing list, a discussion which has largely consisted of uninformed generalities and personal prejudice.

These links alone would justify the value of my message to list readers, but the moderator chooses to hide this information from them. He is apparently so distressed by the thought of someone actually daring to defend the music industry that he chooses to censor my posting rather than allow people to read it.

I hope that subscribers to the cryptography mailing list will let the moderator know what they think of this policy. If they agree that messages like mine should be suppressed while content-free messages with a more politically acceptable view are published, then fine, say so. But if they want to hear both sides of a controversial issue, and to receive information which will shed informative light on the complex questions involved, they should ask him to let my postings through. Henceforth I will try to copy my messages here so that readers can check periodically to see what else they are being deprived of seeing.

My posting follows....

J.S. Denker criticizes the content industry:

> -- The industry abuses authors and performers.

Only with their express, written consent!

> -- The industry is inefficient.

So is every industry.

> -- Legislation to extend the term of copyright for > works already published is bad policy.

There are many valid reasons for this policy, among them: not doing so imposes a double standard; authors created their works with the expectation that they would benefit from future increases in terms; and considerable damage would be done to valuable corporate brands if copyrighted works like Mickey Mouse movies went into the public domain.

> And unconstitutional.

Now you're claiming to know more constitutional law than the United States Supreme Court, which just decided that such legislation is constitutional!

> -- Privacy, fair use, and other basic rights are under > attack and need vigorous protection.

Fair use at least is not a basic right, and it is questionable whether privacy ought to be thought of in that way. People should be allowed the freedom to make such agreements as they see fit to protect information. If that involves someone voluntarily giving up their privacy, or agreeing not to make even limited and "fair" copies of some digital content, that should be their right.

Back when copyright was enforced by the government, fair use was an appropriate tradeoff for what would otherwise be a very questionable imposition on the public's First Amendment rights. But if publishers' rights can be enforced technologically, there is no longer any need for copyright legislation and no need for a fair use exemption. Rather, the market can identify usage policies which are mutually acceptable to content sellers and buyers.

> -- The DMCA is an abomination. It protects the wrong > things and outlaws the wrong things.

The DMCA has major flaws. At the same time, much of the criticism of the DMCA has been mistaken or exaggerated. I can't count how many times I've seen claims recently that the DMCA prevents reverse engineering for compatibility when it actually has an explicit exemption for this activity. And recent analyses [1] have shown that cryptography research can still be conducted under the DMCA, albeit with some restrictions. The new Super-DMCA laws being passed in some states are much worse and lack the exemptions of the DMCA. However these policy matters will probably be cleared up in time.

> We need a system whereby inventors, authors, performers, > and even publishers get paid for their work. SOMEBODY > needs to bear the cost of this. We need a system > whereby the costs are distributed reasonably. > > We need a system for assigning valuation, distributing > the goods, collecting and distributing the fees, and > penalizing thieves. >> There's work to be done. Let's stop fooling around.

There has been a huge amount of work and discussion on these questions in the past couple of years. A good resource to get started is http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/drm/resources.html, especially the part on Impacts of DRM. There you will also find links such as http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/, an ACM workshop held last fall, and http://www.cfp2002.org/program/fairuse.shtml, a discussion of DRM and fair use at last year's CFP.

[1] https://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/drm/papers/liu-encryption-btlj2003.html

Is Downloading Theft?

[Note - this is an archived version of the original posting from 04:10 AM EDT, Apr 24 2003]

A Canadian survey shows that while baby boomers generally agree that unauthorized downloads of Internet content are theft, their younger Generation X and Y counterparts view the practice as much more acceptable.

Boomers are in their 40's through mid 50's; Gen X covers approximately age 24 to 40; and Gen Y is the youngest, at age 12 to 24. I don't know what they call 10 year olds.

55% of boomers say that downloading songs is "theft", while only 31% of Gen Y agrees. Similar discrepancies exist for downloading movies or for making copies of computer software.

My feeling is that the situation we have today is very nice, but it can't last. Today we can download all kinds of music for free. But there are still huge amounts of new music being produced, new artists and new talent coming along all the time. We get the benefits of a very expensive and elaborate system of music production and promotion without having to pay for it.

What will happen if free downloads continue to grow in popularity, so that the record business can no longer make money? People's views on this question seem to depend closely on whether they think it is OK to download music. Those who accept it (like the Gen Y'ers above) seem to think that it won't make much difference if music companies go out of business, that people will continue to make music just for the love of it. Plus, new technology will make it even easier to create professional sounding albums. You won't need an expensive music producer, you can get just as good results with your computer.

Those who oppose downloads tend to believe that if music companies can no longer get paid, there won't be much new music being produced. And similar reasoning applies to other forms of content.

It sure would be nice if we could run an experiment and see which side is right.

Cryptography Research Content Protection

[Note - this is an archived version of the original posting from 03:10 AM EDT, Apr 24 2003]

Cryptography Research's content protection system is summarized online and apparently described in more detail in the patent application. The basic idea is to include some executable code with the content which would run in a VM in every content player. This code would then make use of pre-existing low-level crypto functions and keys built into the players to decrypt and play the content.

The main advantage of this approach is that as various content protection schemes are cracked, or keys extracted, future releases of content can be updated to use new schemes and to invalidate the stolen keys. Unlike current approaches which build the technology into firmware in players, this method would be much more flexible and adaptable in the face of ongoing attacks.

Note that there would still be limits on what could be done in terms of revising protection schemes, based on the cryptographic primitives which are built into players. If some future design for content protection were invented which relied on the Weil pairing, for example, it would not be implementable if the necessary primitives are not supported on widely used devices.

A disadvantage is that each player must be powerful enough to run this VM program at speed. It's not clear how complex the programs will be or how fast they will have to run. Providing general purpose computing functionality may be more expensive and difficult than implementing a special-purpose standard in firmware and hardware, especially for small portable devices. The CR report estimates that a 1 MIPS processor would be adequate, but they don't offer any justification.

All cryptography-based protection schemes have a fundamental flaw, which is that keys "scraped" out of authorized devices can be used to unlock data and then release it in unprotected form. CR proposes to address this by watermarking the data. For this to work, the watermark must inherently reveal the key which was used for the decryption. This involves the technique broadly known as traitor tracing. The problem is that if the bad guys have access to a considerable number of stolen keys it may be intractable to devise a traitor tracing scheme that can identify them.

CR advocates "forensic watermarking". In the longer report (available by email request) they describe this as a system where there are two versions of selected portions of the content - for example, two alternate versions of a particular movie frame. There would be multiple such "polymorphs" throughout the content, and each device would have keys such that for each polymorph it would see only one version. By randomizing and encrypting the frames it can be arranged that the devices can't even tell which frames are polymorphic. The set of keys assigned to a playback device implicitly identifies the device itself, so that if an unprotected version of the movie is released, the specific versions of the polymorphs that are present will reveal which device did the decryption.

The obvious attack is to combine the output from multiple devices from which keys have been scraped, but this does not work (up to a point) because even when multiple devices are used, there is still enough information in the output to identify which specific devices were involved. CR gives an example of a 90 minute movie, 30 frames per second, with 1% of the frames being polymorphic - 1620 frames. Even if an adversary breaks into 4 playback devices and gets their keys in order to identify the polymorph frames, the manufacturer can identify those four devices with an error probability, according to the formula derived by the CR report, of less than 4 x 10^(-10), an extremely good detection rate.

But what happens if you use the CR formula with the assumption that the attacker cracks one more device for a total of 5? Suddenly the system doesn't work so well, and there are over 10^20 possible sets of 5 devices that could produce the combined output! We go from 4 x 10^(-10) to 10^20 with just one more device. This kind of exponential explosion is common to many traitor tracing schemes. The attackers have an inherent mathematical advantage which is very hard to address. All this is glossed over in the CR analysis.

And this is leaving aside the question of whether we can create polymorphic frames at all - 2 different versions of a movie frame, either of which is equally plausible as an intermediate frame among the others in the sequence. It must be done so that looking at one version of the movie or the other will not call attention in any way to the frames which have been altered like this. And it has to be doable in a completely (or at least largely) automated way, due to the volume of content that would have to be protected.

It also would be desirable to create content that can run on all future players, at a time when many of them may not yet have been built or even designed. For example, pressing a CD today, it should still play on CD players built 10 years from now. Could the content be unlocked by devices whose keys have not yet been chosen, but still be watermarked so as to reveal those keys? Or would we need a centralized key-creation agency which pre-creates all of the keys which will ever be used in a CD player for the rest of time, and then assigns them to manufacturers who enter the CD business? Most of these traitor tracing and broadcast-encryption schemes have been implemented in closed environments like satellite TV broadcasts, but the complexity of a multi-vendor world and an open-ended future may push this technology beyond its current limitations.

Even in the most optimistic assessment, what we would expect to see is a constant struggle between "protectors" and "unlockers". Each success by the unlockers will be thwarted in the next generation of content released by the protectors. But the old content will still be vulnerable. So we would expect that this approach would yield a time window for protection. At the time it was released, new content would use the latest techniques and be relatively secure. Over time, breaks would occur to which content released in the past would be vulnerable. So content in general would have a limited time in which it was protected. This would be the window in which profitability was possible. Content older than some threshold - weeks? months? years? - would be freely available.